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Abstract
Social scientists use many different methods, and there are often
substantial disagreements about which method is appropriate for a
given research question. In response to this uncertainty about the rel-
ative merits of different methods, W. E. B. Du Bois advocated for and
applied “methodological triangulation”. This is to use multiple meth-
ods simultaneously in the belief that, where one is uncertain about the
reliability of any given method, if multiple methods yield the same an-
swer that answer is confirmed more strongly than it could have been
by any single method. Against this, methodological purists believe
that one should choose a single appropriate method and stick with it.
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Using tools from voting theory, we show Du Boisian methodological
triangulation to be more likely to yield the correct answer than purism,
assuming the scientist is subject to some degree of diffidence about the
relative merits of the various methods. This holds even when in fact
only one of the methods is appropriate for the given research question.
1 Introduction
Methodological pluralism is an entrenched fact of life for the working social
scientist. There exist a variety of methods of carrying out social scientific
work that are actually applied in the course of various research projects.
While the contrast between quantitative and qualitative methods is the
most striking, one can find methodological difference within those categories
as well. For instance, ethnographic participant observation and hermeneu-
tic textual analysis are distinct yet equally qualitative methods, whereas
Bayesian and frequentist statistics provide different methods of running quan-
titative analysis.
It is not clear whether the fact of methodological pluralism is beneficial
to social science. One optimistic response, which we shall defend in this pa-
per, is to devise strategies for exploiting methodological pluralism to bolster
the reliability of results obtained in the social sciences. Such strategies have
come to be called methodological triangulation. The idea behind methodolog-
ical triangulation is that the convergence of multiple methods upon a single
conclusion better supports that conclusion than just one of those methods
arriving at the conclusion. Against this, however, pessimists might think
that methodological pluralism is both a result and a source of confusion in
the social sciences, and thus be unmoved by the advocacy of triangulation.
After all, somebody who deduces that 2 + 2 = 4 need not have their con-
fidence bolstered by the fact that somebody who says that the sum of any
two numbers is 4 has converged on the same answer as them in this case.
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Nor should they be concerned by their lack of triangulation with the person
who always says “5”. To somebody who sees methodological pluralism as
arising from widespread methodological error, it may therefore be unclear
why methodological triangulation should be beneficial.
There is indeed a persistent vein of skepticism about methodological
triangulation running through the literature. A class of theorists we term
“methodological purists” argue that in order to understand any given phe-
nomenon there is one method that should be used at the exclusion of oth-
ers (McEvoy and Richards 2006, p. 68). There are, typically, two sorts
of arguments for this. The first is that different methods are often based
on such wildly different presuppositions that any attempt to combine them
can only lead to mischief or confusion. Kelle summarized this view as fol-
lows: “[r]esearch methods are often developed within differing research tra-
ditions carrying varying epistemological and theoretical assumptions with
them. Thus the combination of methods. . . [will] not lead to more valid re-
sults” (Kelle 2005, p. 99; see also Blaikie 1991, p. 115, and Sim and Sharp
1998, p. 27). Sim and Sharp (1998, p. 26) claim that to avoid issues such as
this one would have to decide in favor of one method and its accompanying
theory. Since the fact of methodological pluralism in the social sciences is
partially the result of theorists being unable to decide which paradigm to
adopt, this would not bode well for methodological triangulation. Contrary
to this, our argument for methodological triangulation shall not depend on
methods having shared presuppositions beyond assuming that they can be
addressed to the same questions.
The second sort of argument rests upon the sheer difficulty of actually
simultaneously running multiple methodologies (cf. Farmer et al. 2006). This
has led some to go so far as to argue that “using several different methods
can actually increase the chance of error” (Kelle 2005, p. 99), since overtaxed
scholars will be more haphazard in their work. Contrary to this, our argu-
ment for methodological triangulation shall not require that one individual
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is doing the work of applying the various methods, instead adopting the po-
sition of an agent able to survey the results of multiple lines of inquiry, which
may have been carried out by separate research teams.
Recently, Hudson has offered a book-length critique of the idea that
methodological triangulation can be exploited to increase the reliability of
results obtained in scientific research (Hudson 2014). Especially relevant to
our purposes in this paper are two arguments he develops therein. First, he
argues that a number of purported cases of methodological triangulation be-
ing used to great success in the sciences are not in fact examples thereof, and
so cannot be used as empirical evidence for the success of the strategy. Sec-
ond, he argues that probabilistic arguments for methodological triangulation
work by effectively arguing that the causal process underlying the various
methods triangulating upon a given result are independent and as such that
their convergence can only be explained by “the reliability of all the processes
that generate this report, along with the presumption that the report is true”
(Hudson 2014, p. 24).
Our argument responds to both of these. First, as will be made clear in
§2, our model of methodological triangulation is closely based on an actual
instance of methodological triangulation being deployed in a classic work of
social science, one not considered in the previous literature on methodolog-
ical triangulation that Hudson responds to in his book. Second, the results
we prove very explicitly do not rely on any notion of independence that can
be leveraged into an argument for the reliability of the underlying methods
triangulating upon the result in question. We will show that even assuming
the opposite of this (explicitly granting that some methods are essentially
randomization devices) one can still sometimes do better through triangula-
tion.
Stegenga (2012) has criticized defenders of triangulation for cherry-pick-
ing from the history of science. He points out that when multiple methods
are addressed to the same question this frequently yields “discordant” evi-
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dence: different answers are supported by different methods. Defenders of
triangulation have only addressed cases of “concordant” evidence in which
all methods agree on the answer, according to Stegenga. In contrast, the
results we prove apply both to cases of concordant and discordant evidence,
so our argument avoids this objection.
Finally, note that another motivation for methodological purism would
be the conviction that one’s favored method is simply epistemically superior,
or, at least, epistemically superior when applied to some particular class of
problems. Of course, while that may motivate methodological purism, it is
unlikely by itself to persuade those of different methodological predilections.
Hence, one rarely finds the conviction expressed in so naked a form in the lit-
erature. That said, it is not difficult to find works by partisans of qualitative
versus quantitative methodology, or vice versa, in which they argue for their
preferred style of research (see Bryman 1984 for a review and Tewksbury
2009 for a recent example). Hence it is worth explicitly noting this source of
support for methodological purism, as sheer preference for one method over
another is plausibly what motivates many in their methodological purism.
Against this, we shall argue that the recognition that one method is superior
should not by itself motivate methodological purism.
In order to respond to this skepticism about the merits of triangulation
we outline a formal model of methodological triangulation in §3. This model
is designed to be an abstraction from an actual use of methodological trian-
gulation in Du Bois (1996 [1899], to be described in detail in §2), while at the
same time remaining maximally generous to the opponent of methodological
triangulation. Within our model there are multiple methods being run si-
multaneously to ascertain which of several propositions ought to be believed.
We then show that under a variety of scenarios favorable to the purist, in-
cluding scenarios more pessimistic in their appraisal of rival methods than
any actual purists are likely to countenance, methodological triangulation
still provides a good guide to truth, providing one exhibits what we call Du
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Boisian diffidence, as discussed below. That is to say, there are reasons for
an observer of a process of inquiry who is not sure which method to trust to
none the less assent to the proposition which has been endorsed by multiple
methods. The formal tools we use for this investigation are borrowed from
voting theory, and more particularly the literature surrounding Condorcet’s
Jury Theorem (Grofman et al. 1983, List and Goodin 2001). We rely on some
existing results and prove some new ones. We conclude in §4 by suggesting
lines of future research.
There have long been practicing social scientists who have thought that
methodological pluralism was an exploitable resource. W. E. B. Du Bois,
writing in the 1890s, is perhaps the earliest example of a scholar advocating
methodological triangulation (Wortham 2005). He claimed that pluralism
could be exploited to overcome the fact that “the methods of social research
are at present so liable to inaccuracies that the careful student discloses the
results of individual research with diffidence” (Du Bois 1996 [1899], p. 2). We
therefore say that a scholar is in a state of Du Boisian diffidence just in case
they are not confident which (if any) of various competing methodologies to
trust. Du Bois thought that the use of multiple methods to study the same
problem “may perhaps have corrected to some extent the errors of each”
(Du Bois 1996 [1899], p. 3), but he did not outline why this should be. We
take ourselves to be providing the mathematical foundations for Du Bois’
insight, explaining why triangulation works in the type of situation he found
himself in.
Other social scientists have followed Du Bois in making use of method-
ological triangulation in their work (e.g., Farrall et al. 1997, Cunningham
et al. 2000, Mangan et al. 2004, Jack and Raturi 2006). Furthermore, discus-
sions in the philosophy of climate science (e.g., Parker 2011) and philosophy
of biology (e.g., Weisberg and Reisman 2008) suggest that it is not just social
scientists who make use of triangulation in their work. Although the focus of
our argument here is on the social sciences, triangulation may be beneficial
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in other fields for the same reasons.
The social scientific literature by itself now contains a multitude of types
of “methodological triangulation”, each with their own rationale (for review
see Thurmond 2001). Hence, although triangulation has been criticized in
ways we mentioned above, we are certainly not the first to argue that tri-
angulation “allows researchers to be more confident of their results” (Jick
1979, p. 608). Except in so far as they explicitly deny the ability of trian-
gulation to provide additional confirmatory support for a hypothesis, we do
not consider our arguments in tension with these alternate accounts of the
benefits of triangulation. We are thus open to the possibility that there are
additional benefits to methodological triangulation.
The tradition of work closest to ours in defending methodological trian-
gulation is that which has implicitly or explicitly appealed to confirmation
theory. At least as far back as Hempel, confirmation theorists have acknowl-
edged that “the confirmation of a hypothesis depends not only on the quan-
tity of the favorable evidence available, but also on its variety: the greater
the variety, the stronger the resulting support” (Hempel 1966, p. 34). Fur-
ther, while philosophers dispute the concept’s precise meaning, some scholars
who discuss Whewell’s notion of “consilience” interpret this in line with the
idea that triangulation increases confirmatory support (Laudan 1971, Fisch
1985, Snyder 2005; for application see Leung and van de Vijver 2008). More
recently, Fredericks and Miller (1988, p. 350) argue that Carnappian confir-
mation theory explains how it is that triangulation upon a proposition serves
to increase one’s rational degree of confidence in that proposition. Risjord
et al. (2001, 2002) have even argued in the other direction, using the phe-
nomenon of methodological triangulation to support a coherentist theory of
confirmation. Finally, Bayesian theorists have developed results within their
framework about the benefits of independent sources of evidence which are
closely related to our discussion (e.g., Fitelson 2001, Claveau 2013). We
advance on this previous work by providing a formal argument in favor of
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methodological triangulation which does not rely on any specifically Bayesian
assumptions, thus avoiding the critiques that have been leveled at such as-
sumptions (Stegenga 2012, appendix).
2 Du Bois’ Use Of Triangulation
The model we develop in the next section provides a mathematical foundation
for, and generalization of, the form of methodological triangulation actually
deployed by Du Bois. To evince this claim, and to illustrate methodological
triangulation at work in a piece of classic social scientific research, we discuss
an especially explicit example of methodological triangulation at work in
Du Bois’ The Philadelphia Negro.
Du Bois had carried out an exhaustive series of door-to-door surveys and
interviews with all (or almost all) households in the predominantly Negro
Seventh Ward of Philadelphia (to avoid anachronism, we follow Du Bois’
terminology in using “Negro” rather than the more contemporary “African
American”). With this information in hand, he asked “What do Negroes
earn?” In particular, Du Bois was attempting to discern how many Negro
households fall within various income brackets. Immediately upon raising
the question he conceded “Such a question is difficult to answer with any-
thing like accuracy. Only returns based on actual written accounts would
furnish thoroughly reliable statistics; such accounts cannot be had in this
case” (Du Bois 1996 [1899], p. 168). Instead, Du Bois had available to him
four methods: (1) direct estimations of income offered by families during
interviews, (2) information based on combined average income for the pro-
fessions represented in a given household, (3) family members’ estimations of
time lost to work, given their occupation, and (4) the apparent circumstances
of the family judging from the appearance of the home and occupants, rent
paid, presence of lodgers, etc. (Du Bois 1996 [1899], p. 169). However, doubts
and reservations are expressed about the reliability of all four of these meth-
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ods of discerning household income (Du Bois 1996 [1899], pp. 169–170). As
such, Du Bois makes it explicit that he is in a situation of what we call Du
Boisian diffidence: he does not know which of the available methods will
yield reliable answers to the question he is asking.
Faced with this problem, the procedure Du Bois adopted was as follows.
For each household, he deployed all four methods, and gave an estimation of
income based on “three or more” of the four methods just described (Du Bois
1996 [1899], p. 169). That is to say, Du Bois used the methods as providing a
kind of vote on a household’s income bracket, and where a strict majority of
methods agreed he placed the household in the agreed-upon bracket. We note
that where Du Bois says that “in most cases, the first item was given greatest
weight in settling the matter; but was modified by the others” (Du Bois 1996
[1899], p. 169), we interpret that as meaning that this was a weighted voting
procedure, with favor given to method (1).
This, then, was Du Bois’ application of methodological triangulation in
a clear case of Du Boisian diffidence. Two weaknesses stand out in this
procedure. First, Du Bois never gives any good argument that the agreement
of a majority of methods, each admitted to be of dubious reliability, is any
reason to be confident in a given income bracket classification. For all Du Bois
said, it is not obvious that this procedure of triangulation actually helps given
the epistemic situation he faced.
We note that this is not the only occasion on which Du Bois appealed
to triangulation when in a situation of Du Boisian diffidence. In Du Bois
(2000, a 1905 essay which did not appear in print until 2000) much time
is spent laying out the difficulties human free will creates for discovering
and confirming the existence of sociological laws, hence giving us cause for
some Du Boisian diffidence in sociology. In response to this, Du Bois again
praises a multi-method approach to studying human society, saying that “our
knowledge of human life has been vastly increased by Statisticians, Ethnolo-
gists, Political Scientists, Economists, Students of Finance and Philanthropy,
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Criminologists, Educators, Moral Philosophers, and critics of art and liter-
ature” (Du Bois 2000, p. 42). In fact, his critique of these studies was that
there has not been enough attempt at triangulation between them, as he be-
moaned the “lack of adequate recognition of the essential unity in the various
studies of human activity, and of effort to discover and express that unity”
(Du Bois 2000, p. 43). Once again, however, while Du Bois plainly does
think people should try and connect up the results of various approaches to
sociological inquiry, he does not clearly state what the advantage in doing
so would be. A consistent feature of his work thus seems to be that Du Bois
advocated triangulation as a methodological response to diffidence, but did
not offer clear or explicit argument in favor of this response.
The second weakness that stands out in Du Bois’s use of triangulation is
that it is not clear how to generalize it. Suppose that of his four methods, (2)
and (4) suggested the income of a given household was between $ 10 and $ 15
(per week), (1) suggested the income of said household was between $ 5 and
$ 10, and (3) put the income at more than $ 15. On our reading of the text,
which is admittedly unclear on this point, Du Bois would have two options
available to him in such a scenario. Given his stated policy of giving greater
weight to method (1), he could put the household’s income down as “between
$ 5 and $ 10”, despite the other methods agreeing that the household is not
in this bracket. But then why not generally just deploy method (1), since it
is apparently trusted enough to overrule a unanimous judgment of all other
methods (that the income is greater than $ 10)? The other response available
to Du Bois is to say that here the procedure simply fails to give an answer
as to the household’s income, and Du Bois must throw away the data point.
From the text it is not clear if Du Bois ever faced such scenarios nor, if
he did, how he responded. The model we develop in the next section solves
both these problems, and illustrates that Du Bois’ procedure is capable of
being placed on secure foundations, while also yielding a general response to
the situation of the diffident inquirer.
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3 The Model
We will introduce our model in terms of the example elaborated in the previ-
ous section. Suppose we wanted to know the income of a particular household
in late nineteenth century Philadelphia. Following Du Bois we distinguish
four possible answers by introducing income brackets — less than $ 5 (per
week), between $ 5 and $ 10, between $ 10 and $ 15, or more than $ 15. We
also assume that one answer is in some (epistemic) sense superior to the
others (call this the “correct” answer). In our example we will suppose the
correct answer is “between $ 5 and $ 10”.
Three purist scholars set out to investigate the matter. One goes door
to door asking whoever opens the door to report the household’s income.
Another estimates the household’s income based on the profession(s) of those
members of the household who work. And a third estimates their income
based on the appearance of the house and its occupants.
First suppose that each of these methods has some positive connection
with the correct answer. Say each method has, independently of the other
methods, a 1/3 probability of yielding the answer “between $ 5 and $ 10”,
and only a 2/9 probability each for each of the other three answers.
Now we introduce a final actor, the triangulator (modeled on Du Bois,
except without giving favor to any particular method), who runs no investiga-
tion of her own, but adopts the strategy: pick whatever answer is triangulated
upon, otherwise guess between any of the answers selected by at least one
method. In this example, the triangulator has a 29/81 probability of getting
the answer “between $ 5 and $ 10”. Since 29/81 > 1/3, the triangulator has
a better chance of settling on the right answer than the purists.
It might be thought that this result is an artifact of the particular numbers
we chose. Theorem 1 shows this suspicion to be mistaken. In order to state
the theorem, we need a little more notation.
Suppose there are m methods a1, . . . , am available to address a given
question. The question has n possible answers b1, . . . , bn, one of which is
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“correct”. Without loss of generality, suppose the correct answer is b1.
Each method, independently from the others, yields upon application one
answer it endorses (we will call this the answer “picked” by that method). A
method picks answer bj with probability rj. The positive connection to the
correct answer is represented by the assumption that r1 > rj for all j 6= 1.
So each method is more likely to pick the correct answer than it is to pick
any given incorrect answer.
A purist picks a single method and always believes the answer picked by
that method to be the correct answer. By assumption, then, the purist’s
belief is correct with probability r1. A triangulator looks at the answers
picked by all the methods available to her, and believes the answer picked
by the greatest number of methods to be the correct one (if multiple answers
are tied for being picked the most times, she picks a random answer among
the tied ones to believe). Let pj denote the probability that the triangulator
ends up believing answer bj.
Theorem 1. p1 ≥ r1 for all n and m. The inequality is strict whenever
m ≥ 3 and n ≥ 2. Moreover, p1 is increasing in m.
This is a slightly strengthened version of List and Goodin (2001, propo-
sition 1). A proof is available from the authors upon request.
So not only does a triangulator do better than a purist, a triangulator
with more methods available also does better than a triangulator with less
methods available. In fact, as the number of methods increases, it becomes
virtually certain that the triangulator will get it right: p1 → 1 as m → ∞
(List and Goodin 2001, proposition 2).
The above result arguably captures what Du Bois had in mind. Each
method yields some evidence. Perhaps this evidence is not particularly strong
on its own, but taken together the various methods can support a conclusion
quite strongly. However, from the purist’s perspective it may seem that
our analysis is rigged: we assumed that each method has some probabilistic
connection to the correct answer (“the reliability of all the processes”, in
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Hudson’s terminology), whereas in reality (according to the purist) only the
purist’s preferred method does. So let us now turn to that scenario.
As it turns out, suppose, asking people directly to report their income
really is The One True Method, sure to give the correct answer (that the
income is between $ 5 and $ 10), and the other two methodologies are more
or less glorified guesswork (probability 1/4 of yielding each of the four possible
answers).
Note that “guesswork” is the weakest possible assumption we can make
about a method, as it entails that the results of this method provide no
information whatsoever. If we made the “weaker” assumption of a negative
connection with the correct answer (probability less than 1/4 of yielding
the answer “between $ 5 and $ 10”) the method actually becomes potentially
more useful: an “anti-triangulator” could use such a method to determine
which answers are likely to be incorrect. We take the worst case scenario for
a method to be that it is never more informative than guesswork. Further,
since no opponent of triangulation has proposed using methods to knock out
potential answers we assume guesswork is what they have in mind when they
say other methods are bad.
In this case the triangulator has a 9/16 probability of settling on the
answer “between $ 5 and $ 10”. She is doing worse than the purist who asks
people to report their income directly (this purist gets the correct answer
with probability 1) but better than the other two purists (who get the correct
answer with probability 1/4).
What should we conclude from this? Obviously the triangulator is not
doing as well as the first purist. So if we know that asking people to report
their own income is The One True Method there is no reason to use method-
ological triangulation. This, we note, is consistent with Lahno (2014), who
argues that if one is in certain kinds of evidential states one may do better by
avoiding answers that have been triangulated upon. Similarly, in our model
there are occasions where one does better not to use triangulation. But to
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know one is in the case Lahno discusses one has to have a good understand-
ing of how well one’s methods respond to evidence of various sorts. Whereas
we take it that if one was in a position to know exactly how it is one’s meth-
ods were responding to evidence, one would not be in a state of Du Boisian
diffidence about them, and may even know which is The One True Method.
As we shall now argue, it is when one is not sure about how one’s methods
are responding to evidence that one should use triangulation.
For, if we are in a case of Du Boisian diffidence things are different. Even
if we know that there is a true method and the other two are just guesswork,
it is good to be a triangulator: the triangulator gets it right 9 out of 16 times,
whereas guessing what the right method is and sticking with that one only
gets it right 8 out of 16 times (1 · 1/3 + 1/4 · 2/3 = 1/2). Triangulation is a
sensible response to ignorance about the performance of one’s own methods.
Here again one might worry that the result is a numerical artifact, but
once again we can assuage this worry. Consider the same setup as before,
except now there is a special m+1-st method (call it a0) which always picks
the correct answer (answer b1), while the other m methods pick any answer
with probability 1/n.
The purist chooses a method at random; this reflects Du Boisian diffi-
dence: the purist does not know which method is The One True Method.
The purist then believes whatever answer that method picks to be the cor-
rect one. Not only does this guessing at the correct method represent a high
degree of uncertainty, or Du Boisian diffidence, it also captures something
about the present state of social scientific inquiry. In fields which are largely
pre-paradigm there will be competing “schools”, and attendant competing
methodologies. Plausibly this is the case in most of the social sciences. What
method a scholar ends up using is largely determined by which school they
get educated into, and this itself will be a function of choices they made as
an undergrad and before, at points when they had no idea about the rel-
ative merits of competing schools and methodologies. This is effectively a
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kind of randomization, or at least may reasonably be modeled as such. While
methodological purists may not consciously randomize between potential ap-
proaches, at least in the social sciences we think they very often are de facto
choosing at random among the methods.
The triangulator, as before, believes whatever answer is picked by the
most methods (randomizing in case of ties). Let pj and qj denote the proba-
bilities of believing answer bj for the triangulator and the purist respectively.
Theorem 2. p1 ≥ q1 for all n and m. The inequality is strict whenever
m ≥ 2 and n ≥ 2.
This result and theorem 3 are proved in appendix A.
We believe the above scenario is the most favorable possible scenario
for the methodological purist, because it assumes that the purist’s preferred
method is as good as it could possibly be and the other methods are as bad
as they could possibly be. We hence think that showing that methodological
triangulation can be valuable in this scenario is our strongest argument in
triangulation’s favor. But it might still be objected that it is unrealistic that
The One True Method delivers the correct answer with probability 1.
So now consider a case in which asking people to report their income
directly (The One True Method) yields the answer “between $ 5 and $ 10”
with probability 1/3 (2/9 each for the other three possible answers) while
the other methods are random (1/4 for each answer). In this case the trian-
gulator gets the answer “between $ 5 and $ 10” with probability 41/144. The
triangulator does worse than the first purist (41/144 < 1/3) but better than
the other two (1/4 < 41/144). Just as before, if a scientist is subject to Du
Boisian diffidence triangulation is the way to go. In particular, triangulation
does better than guessing a method and being a purist about that method
(1/3 · 1/3 + 1/4 · 2/3 = 40/144 < 41/144).
More generally, suppose that method a0 picks answer bj with probabil-
ity rj and assume that r1 > 1/n (so a0 favors b1 more than chance, although
another answer might be favored even more). As before, the other methods
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pick randomly: any answer bj has a 1/n chance of being picked. pj and qj
are defined as above.
Theorem 3. p1 ≥ q1 for all n and m. The inequality is strict whenever
m ≥ 2 and n ≥ 2.
4 Conclusion
Some social scientists have attempted to exploit the fact of methodological
pluralism by claiming that where triangulation can be achieved this provides
more support for the point triangulated upon than any method considered
individually could. Though confirmation theorists seemed generally sym-
pathetic to the idea, and saw links between points of interest to them and
methodological triangulation, what demonstrations they did produce tended
to make heavy use of explicitly Bayesian assumptions. Further, other social
scientists expressed skepticism about the benefits of triangulation.
Our model has vindicated individuals’ use of methodological triangula-
tion, and thus also the instincts of the confirmation theorists, without the
Bayesian baggage. In line with Du Bois’ methodological advice and scientific
practice, triangulation does provide confirmatory support — and, in partic-
ular, it does so even if one is not sure which of one’s available methods can
actually be relied upon.
Since we were following Du Bois in this we take ourselves to have sup-
plied underpinnings for at least some of the actual social scientific rationale
for methodological triangulation. In particular, our model closely mirrors an
explicit deployment of methodological triangulation by Du Bois (1996 [1899])
in his scientific work. We therefore take our model to represent a mathemati-
cal foundation for a practically viable procedure for deploying methodological
triangulation in the social sciences. Even if it is true that, at present, most
scientists do not in practice run elections among methods to exploit method-
ological pluralism and thereby boost the reliability of their results, Du Bois
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did. Since what is actual is possible, others could too, and our model suggests
they may benefit from doing so.
The net effect of our arguments is to give those scholars who feel some
degree of Du Boisian diffidence about the available methods in the social
sciences reason to be happy about the fact of methodological pluralism. The
various epistemological and methodological battles that have plagued the
social sciences need not be resolved before one can proceed. Nor does the
proliferation of methods necessarily need to be viewed as unfortunate.
Rather, we find that the tolerance of methodological pluralism does the
diffident individual benefit, by allowing them to exploit triangulation in order
to better arrive at the truth. We accept that to those who feel no degree of
diffidence, our arguments may be less moving. In particular, to those who
feel that the one true method in the social sciences should be qualitative,
these arguments may all seem question begging. But in our experience some
degree of Du Boisian diffidence is the typical state of the scholar, and thus
we take our results to be of interest to a broad range of people.
We end by suggesting three additional lines of research that build on the
present work.
One source of anti-confirmationist skepticism we have not addressed is
the worry that there is widespread correlated error. We can distinguish two
questions here. The first question is concerned with individuating methods.
For example, when we have a mathematical model (say, an economists’ ratio-
nal choice model) the parameters of which can be fitted based on data, does
that count as one method or is each parametrization of the model a different
method? Under a coarse-grained approach there will be fewer methods but
they are less likely to display correlated error, whereas under a fine-grained
approach there will be more methods but these methods are more likely to
be correlated. To put the point more positively, if we suspect that two ap-
proaches we have so far counted as different methods (almost) always give
the same answer, then we should count these as only one method for the
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purpose of triangulation. In practice it may be difficult to identify whether
methods are independent in the relevant sense (Stegenga 2012, Schupbach
2015). But Kuorikoski and Marchionni (2016) provide evidence that such in-
dependence holds in at least some cases. Future work could fruitfully explore
the question of how to individuate methods in more detail.
Second, we may ask how highly correlated methods need to be before
the results reported in §3 no longer hold. We leave this question for future
work. The formal apparatus deployed here makes it possible to explore the
circumstances in which correlated error will undo the advantages of trian-
gulation. We may expect to find results similar in spirit to those that have
been found in the previously mentioned Bayesian tradition (Fitelson 2001,
Claveau 2013).
Finally, our arguments were markedly about the benefits of methodolog-
ical triangulation for the diffident individual. However, work in social epis-
temology implies that what may be a rational strategy for an individual
inquirer may be disadvantageous for the community as a whole if generally
adopted (Mayo-Wilson et al. 2011). Hence, while our model vindicates in-
dividuals in exploiting methodological triangulation, it does not show that
science would be better off if all scientists were triangulators. Future work in
this field could thus profitably explore a game-theoretic (or otherwise social)
model of the operation of methodological triangulation. We hope the work
we have done here shall provide a useful foundation for further work in the
field.
A Proofs
For ease of exposition, we prove our results in the terminology of voting
theory. The methods are the voters and the possible answers to the research
question are the candidates.
Consider elections of the following form: there are n candidates b1, . . . , bn,
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and m + 1 voters a1, . . . , am, and a0 (the reason we single out a0 will be
explained shortly). Formally, we can describe a vote as a function v :
{a1, . . . , am, a0} → {b1, . . . , bn}. Each vote v induces a probability measure
µv on the set of candidates defined as follows:
• µv(bk) = 1 iff |v−1(bk)| > |v−1(bj)| whenever j 6= k, i.e. candidate bk
receives the most votes outright.
• µv(bk) = 1/` iff |v−1(bk)| ≥ |v−1(bj)| for every 1 ≤ j ≤ n, and there are
` candidates, including bk, who receive the maximum number of votes.
Additionally, we may suppose that pi is a probability measure on the space
X of all possible votes. We define the overall probability pk that bk wins to
be the quantity:
∫
X
µv(bk)dpi =
∑
v∈X
µv(bk)pi(v)
We will consider the following two procedures for choosing a candidate
using a vote:
1. Choose candidate bk with probability pk (i.e., choose the winner of the
vote). This is the triangulator’s procedure.
2. Choose a voter y ∈ {a1, . . . , am, a0} randomly and uniformly, then
choose the candidate chosen by voter y, i.e., choose candidate bk with
probability
∫
X δ(bk, v(y))dpi =
∑
v∈X δ(bk, v(y))pi(v). This is the purist’s
procedure.
Here δ(a, b) = 1 if a = b and δ(a, b) = 0 otherwise. We see that in
procedure 2, we hire candidate bk with probability qk defined as follows:
qk =
1
m+ 1
∑
0≤i≤m
∑
v∈X
δ(bk, v(ai))pi(v)
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Lemma 4. Let Av be the random variable |v−1(b1)|. Then q1 = E(Av)/(m+
1).
Proof. For any fixed v ∈ X, we have
|v−1(b1)| =
∑
0≤i≤m
δ(b1, v(ai)).
It follows that
E(Av) =
∑
v∈X
∑
0≤i≤m
δ(b1, ai)pi(v).
We now focus on the special case where a0 votes for b1 and a1, . . . , am
vote randomly, uniformly, and independently. Set Y = {v ∈ X : v(a0) = b1}.
Lemma 5. Let Bv be the random variable max(|v−1(bj)| : 1 ≤ j ≤ n).
Additionally, assume that pi is supported on Y and uniform on Y . Then
p1 = E(Bv)/(m+ 1).
Proof. Fix a vote v. Notice first that
Bv =
∑
0≤i≤m
µv(v(ai)).
Now the assumption that pi is uniform is equivalent to asserting that
voter a0 votes for b1 while voters a1, . . . , ak each pick a candidate randomly,
uniformly, and independently. In particular, we have for any 0 ≤ i ≤ m that
p1 =
∑
v∈Y
µv(v(a0))pi(v) =
∑
v∈Y
µv(v(ai))pi(v).
Remark. Note that E(Bv) is the same for any pi where voters a1, . . . , am vote
randomly, uniformly, and independently; we will use this later to consider
changing the manner in which a0 votes.
Theorem 2. If pi is supported on Y and uniform on Y , then p1 ≥ q1. The
inequality is strict whenever m ≥ 2 and n ≥ 2.
20
Proof. The first assertion is immediate from Lemmas 4 and 5 as Bv ≥ Av. If
m ≥ 2 and n ≥ 2, there is some v ∈ Y with Bv > Av (any vote where there
is some outright winner who is not b1 works).
Remark. Notice that in the setting of Theorem 2, we have q1 = (m +
n)/(n(m + 1)). In particular, for any pi in which a1, . . . , am vote randomly,
uniformly, and independently, we have E(Bv) ≥ (m + n)/n, with strict in-
equality for m,n ≥ 2. We will use this in the proof of Theorem 3.
We now prove the same result for pi in which a0 votes for bi with proba-
bility ri, where r1 > 1/n.
Theorem 3. Suppose pi is a measure where a1, . . . , am vote randomly, uni-
formly, and independently (and independently of a0), and suppose a0 votes
for bi with probability ri, where r1 > 1/n. Then p1 ≥ q1, with strict inequality
whenever m,n ≥ 2.
Proof. In the proof of Lemma 5 (and in the remark after), we saw that the
probability that a0 votes for the winner of v is exactly E(Bv)/(m + 1). So
to compute p1 in terms of E(Bv), we need to consider two cases: if a0 does
vote for b1, we want to count the probability that a0 voted for the winner,
whereas if a0 votes for b2, . . . , bn, we want to count the probability that a0
does not vote for the winner and that b1 did in fact win. We see that:
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p1 = r1
(
E(Bv)
m+ 1
)
+ (1− r1)
(
m+ 1− E(Bv)
(m+ 1)(n− 1)
)
= r1
(
E(Bv)(n− 1)
(m+ 1)(n− 1)
)
+ (1− r1)
(
m+ 1− E(Bv)
(m+ 1)(n− 1)
)
= (1− r1)(m+ 1) + E(Bv)(r1n− 1)(m+ 1)(n− 1)
≥ (1− r1)(m+ 1)n+ (m+ n)(r1n− 1)(m+ 1)(n− 1)n
= (m+ r1n)(n− 1)(m+ 1)(n− 1)n
Now q1 is just given by Lemma 4:
q1 = E(Av)/(m+ 1)
= m+ r1n
n(m+ 1)
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